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ABSTRACT
In the paper the author proposes that effectively and efficiently addressing cyber
crime requires a shift in paradigm. For businesses and government departments
alike the focus should be on prevention, rather than the prosecution of cyber
criminals. The Defence in Depth strategy poses a practical solution for achieving
Information Assurance in today’s highly networked environments. In a world
where “absolute security” is an unachievable goal, the concept of Information
Assurance poses significant benefits to securing one of an organization’s most
valuable assets: Information. It will be argued that the approach of achieving
Information Assurance within an organisation, coupled with the implementation
of a Defence in Depth strategy can ensure that information is kept secure and
readily available and provides a competitive advantage to those willing to invest
and maintain such a strategy.
Keywords: cyber crime, cyber law, defence in depth, layered defence,
information assurance, information security, public private partnerships, risk
management
1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH
The President in his State of the Nation address on 3 June 2009 specifically
referred to an increased effort to combat cyber crime and identity theft.
Cyber criminals in South Africa have increased their attacks in both the private
and public sector, with the most prevalent (cyber) offence remaining that of
identity theft. However, it must be borne in mind that identity theft is in most
cases a means to an end: to assume someone’s identity to evade the police, to
obtain credit on someone else’s credentials where the criminal is not able to do
1
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that on his/her own, to gain access to bank accounts, to launder money, etc.
But at the heart of cyber crime in South Africa lies the true asset these criminals
wish to obtain: information. Information has become the most important asset
any business or government department has and it is this information that enables
a criminal to assume another identity, to log into another’s bank account, to steal
confidential information, to deny an organisation access to its critical information
systems. Yet we fail to protect it with the same vigour as we protect our money
or property.
Secondly, South African law enforcement has been hampered in effectively
dealing with this breed of criminals, due to for example resource constraints and a
lack of sufficient training. We also have no accurate statistics to determine the
true value of these crimes, nor the extent to which they have harmed our country.
Dealing with cyber crime in South Africa calls for a shift in paradigm: new
investigative methodologies and techniques, an increase in effective public private
partnerships, better sharing of business intelligence and information and most
importantly, moving from a re-active to a pro-active approach to dealing with
cyber crime.
This paper aims to show that prevention is better than prosecution. Devoting time
and resources to implement strategies that make it difficult for criminals to
perpetrate their crimes within organisations is more efficient and cost effective
than trying to catch them after you had been the victim of a cyber attack. And in
the unlikely event that you do fall victim to cyber crime and you have the right
strategy and systems in place, you would also have a disaster recovery plan in
place that enables the organisation to effectively and efficiently deal with the
consequences of an attack, an audit trail that can point your investigation in the
right direction and evidentiary material available that could stand the scrutiny of a
court.
Catching and eventually prosecuting cyber criminals are difficult and costly, both
in terms of money, time and resources. For businesses and government alike the
reputational damage attached to a cyber attack can also be costly.
The author is of the opinion that implementing the five core principles of
Information Assurance and the Defence in Depth strategy, poses significant
benefits to the prevention of cyber crime within South African businesses, as well
as in government. It will be submitted that the approach of achieving Information
Assurance within the organisation, coupled with the implementation of a Defence
in Depth strategy can ensure that information is kept secure and provide a
competitive advantage to those willing to invest in such a strategy.
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2. INFORMATION ASSURANCE
2.1 Definition
Information Assurance is defined in Wikipedia as the practice of managing
information-related risks. More specifically, Information Assurance seeks to
protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, availability and non-repudiation. These
goals are relevant whether the information is in storage, processing, or transit and
whether threatened by malice or accident. In other words, Information Assurance
is the process of ensuring that the right users have access to the right information
at the right time.
According to the US Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and
Associated Words, 2003 Information Assurance is defined as information
operations that protect and defend information and information systems by
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.
Information Assurance is closely related to Information Security and the terms are
sometimes used interchangeably. However, its broader connotation also includes
reliability and emphasises strategic risk management over tools and tactics. In
addition to defending against malicious hackers and code, Information Assurance
includes other corporate governance issues such as privacy, compliance, audits,
business continuity and disaster recovery. Whilst Information Security draws
primarily from computer science, Information Assurance is interdisciplinary and
draws from multiple fields, including accounting, fraud examination, forensic
science, management science, systems engineering, security engineering and
criminology, in addition to computer science.
Information Assurance can be viewed as an umbrella concept bringing together
issues of information security and dependability. It must always be borne in mind
that “absolute security” is an unachievable goal. What the concept of Information
Assurance proposes is defined in its name: it is providing organisations with an
acceptable level of assurance that even when there are attempts to interfere with
the security, availability and reliability of networks and systems, there will still be
an acceptable level of functionality.
2.2 Objective of Information Assurance
The objective of Information Assurance is to minimise the risk that information
systems and the information stored, transmitted and processed thereon is
vulnerable to threats. This implies that, if an attack does take place, the damage it
might cause will be minimised. It also provides for a method to recover from the
attack as efficiently and effectively as possible.
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Information Assurance requires an organisation to focus on its access controls
(both physical and logical access controls), individual accountability to ensure
that each user of the system can be identified and to provide for audit trails which
can provide historical records when a system is compromised.
2.3 Five Pillars of Information Assurance
Information Security is based on what is known as the CIA triad, namely
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Information Assurance has an
additional two principles namely authenticity and non-repudiation. Together they
form the so-called five pillars of Information Assurance.
INFORMATION ASSURANCE

NON-REPUDIATION

AUTHENTICITY

AVAILABILITY

INTEGRITY

CONFIDENTIALITY

Figure 1: The five pillars of Information Assurance
The National Security Agency of the United States of America (NSA)
recommends that the application of the five pillars of Information Assurance
should be based on the Protect, Detect and React paradigm. This means that in
addition to incorporating protection mechanisms, organisations need to expect
attacks and include attack detection tools and procedures that allow them to react
to and recover from these attacks. It further recommends the implementation of a
Defence in Depth strategy to achieve Information Assurance. This strategy will be
discussed in full below.
Upon analysis of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, No. 25 of
2002 (ECT Act), it becomes clear that the five pillars of Information Assurance is
entrenched in our legislation and that in most instances, a breach in any of these
areas has been criminalised.

2.3.1 Confidentiality
Keeping information confidential implies that information must only be accessed,
used, copied or disclosed by users who have been duly authorised to do so. This
would include for example where you allow someone to only view information
and not copy it for them, but the person was not authorised to see the information
in the first instance.
In terms of section 85 of the ECT Act “access” includes the actions of a person
who, after taking note of any data, becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not
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authorised to access that data and still continues to access that data. Section 86 of
the ECT Act criminalises the unauthorised access to, interception of or
interference with data.
In terms of section 86(2), read with section 89(1) a person who intentionally
accesses or intercepts data without the authority or permission to do so is guilty of
an offence and is liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding twelve months.

2.3.2 Integrity
Data integrity also deals with authorisation and implies that data may not be
created, altered or deleted without the proper authorisation. A loss of integrity
could occur when a computer is infected with a virus, or where someone gains
unauthorised accesses to a server and deletes critical data files. Data integrity is
also important in cases where computer evidence is to be used in court.
In terms of section 14(1) of the ECT Act, where the law requires that information
is to be presented or retained in its original form that requirement is met by a data
message if the integrity of the information from the time when it was first
generated in its final form as a data message or otherwise has passed assessment
and that information is capable of being displayed or produced to the person to
whom it is to be presented.
In terms of section 14(2) the integrity must be assessed by considering whether
the information has remained complete and unaltered, except for the addition of
any endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display, as well as in light of the purpose for which
the information was generated and having regard to any other relevant
circumstance.
Section 17 stipulates that where a law requires a person to produce a document or
information, that requirement is met if the person produces, by means of a data
message, an electronic form of that document or information, and if considering
all the relevant circumstances at the time that the data message was sent, the
method of generating the electronic form of that document provided a reliable
means of assuring the maintenance of the integrity of the information contained in
that document, as well as that at the time the data message was sent, it was
reasonable to expect that the information contained therein would be readily
accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference. Section 17(2) furthermore
provides that the integrity of the information in a document is maintained if the
information has remained complete and unaltered, except for the addition of any
endorsement, or any immaterial change, which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage or display.
Section 86(2), read with section 89(1) of the ECT Act provides that a person who
intentionally and without authority to do so, interferes with data in a way which
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causes such data to be modified, destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective, is
guilty of an offence and is liable for a fine or imprisonment of up to twelve
months.

2.3.3 Authenticity
In simple terms authenticity means that a user that logged on to a computer is in
reality the person whose credentials (e.g. user name and password) was used, or
that documents on a computer have not been altered or forged.
The most common authentication breach in South Africa is where user id’s and
passwords are stolen (identity theft) and used to load false transactions on a
system. One must always bear in mind that identity theft is not when someone
steals your credit card number; it is when someone steals you (Campana, 2006).
According to Scott Charney from Microsoft (Tung, 2008) much has been done in
terms of defence in depth against malware or against phishing schemes, but more
remains to be done. For this to happen, better authentication is required so that
users can make better decisions about what is running on their computers.
Charney also noted that there has been a major shift by software vendors to tie
software more tightly to hardware to solve the problem of authentication.
According to him one needs operating systems that are bound to the hardware, so
that if it is tampered with there is better chance of knowing about, detecting and
remediating the problem.
Chapter VI of the ECT Act provides for the authentication of service providers in
South Africa where accreditation is defined as the recognition of an authentication
product or service by the Accreditation Authority. Authentication products or
services are defined as products or services designed to identify the holder of an
electronic signature to other persons.
In terms of section 86(3), read with section 89(1) a person who unlawfully
produces, sells, offers to sell, procures for use, designs, adapts for use, distributes
or possesses any device, including a computer program or a component, which is
designed primarily to overcome security measures for the protection of data, or
performs any of those acts with regard to a password, access code or any other
similar kind of data with the intent to unlawfully utilise such item to contravene
this section, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not
exceeding twelve months.
Section 86(4), read with section 89(2) furthermore provides that a person who
utilises any device or computer program mentioned in subsection (3) in order to
unlawfully overcome security measures designed to protect such data or access
thereto, is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding
five years.
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2.3.4 Availability
Availability does not only mean that the information on a system must be readily
available, but also that the systems needed to process the information and the
security measures that protect the information are all functioning properly at the
time the information is needed. In simple terms the right information must be
available to the right person at the right time.
During a denial of service (DoS) attack, information is not readily available
because the users cannot access the information on their computers. Section
86(5) of the ECT Act, read with section 89(2) provides that a person who
commits any act with the intent to interfere with access to an information system
so as to constitute a denial, including a partial denial of service to legitimate users
is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding five
years.

2.3.5 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation implies that parties to an electronic transaction are bound in
terms of that transaction: the one party cannot deny having received the
information, nor can the other party deny sending it.
In terms of section 25 of the ECT Act a data message is that of the originator if it
was sent by the originator personally, or by a person who had the authority to
send it on behalf of the originator, or if it was sent by an information system
programmed by or on behalf of the originator to operate automatically, unless it is
proved that the information system did not properly execute such programming.
An acknowledgement of receipt of a data message is not necessary to give legal
effect to the message, but in terms of section 26 of the ECT Act
acknowledgement of receipt may be given by any communication by the
addressee, whether automated or otherwise, or any conduct of the addressee,
sufficient to indicate to the originator that the data message has been received.
In terms of section 23 of the ECT Act a data message used in the conclusion or
performance of an agreement must be regarded as having been sent by the
originator when it enters an information system outside the control of the
originator or, if the originator and addressee are in the same information system,
when it is capable of being retrieved by the addressee. It is also stated that a data
message must be regarded as having been received by the addressee when the
complete data message enters an information system designated or used for that
purpose by the addressee and is capable of being retrieved and processed by the
addressee, and must be regarded as having been sent from the originator's usual
place of business or residence and as having been received at the addressee's usual
place of business or residence.
In electronic commerce digital signatures are commonly used to establish
authenticity and non-repudiation. Section 13 of the ECT Act stipulates that where
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the signature of a person is required by law and such law does not specify the type
of signature, that requirement in relation to a data message is met only if an
advanced electronic signature is used.
3. DEFENCE IN DEPTH STRATEGY
3.1 Introduction
Due to the rapid development of business, IT trends and technology, it has
become increasingly important to maintain proper control of an organisations’
information. It is now commonly recognised that information is one of (if not)
the most valuable assets an organisation has. This information pertains to various
business processes and disciplines within a single organisation: ranging from
strategic management information to basic operational process information.
Defence in Depth is a strategy that can be implemented to achieve Information
Assurance in today’s highly networked environments. According to the NSA it is
a “best practices” strategy in that it relies on the intelligent application of
techniques and technologies that exist today. The strategy is based on balancing
protection capability and cost, performance and operational considerations.
In its report on Defence in Depth, the Trusted Information Sharing Network
(TISN) defines Defence in Depth as the systematic security management of
people, processes and technologies, in a holistic risk-management approach.
The concept is based on military strategy which implements defences primarily to
delay rather than prevent the advance of an attacker. It is assumed that an attack
will lose momentum over time, allowing for those being attacked to respond
appropriately. This strategy is particularly useful when dealing with Information
Assurance as one can never rule out the possibility of an attack, but one can
implement a strategy that effectively and efficiently guards against, monitors and
reports on such attacks and, in the event that an attack does take place provides
for a strategy to address the damage.
According to the TISN (TISN, 2008) the Defence in Depth is far more than an IT
concept, as it delivers:


effective risk-based decisions;



enhanced operational effectiveness;



reduced overall cost and risk; and



improved information security.

Defence in Depth provides an approach to security that is integrated with the
organisation’s business processes and enterprise-wide risk management
capability.
For an organisation to effectively protect its information and information systems
against cyber attacks, it is necessary to determine who the enemy is, why they
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would want to launch an attack against the organisation and how they would then
attack the organisation.
Threats to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of an organisation’s
information assets can arise through its employees, business partners, external
sources and technological innovation. The potential cyber criminal might be a
disgruntled employee that aims to commit corporate espionage or launch a denial
of service attack, or it might be a cyber syndicate that wants to steal user id’s and
passwords to gain access to your client’s bank accounts. Threats can also relate to
intentional and unintentional actions that can potentially harm information assets.
Examples of these threats include the following (TISN, 2008):

PEOPLE

TRADING PARTNERS

• Disgruntled employees

• Business partners with poor data security

• Financially troubled employees

• Physical access to shared systems

• Corporate espionage

• Misunderstanding of allowed access

• Uneducated/uninformed users

• Competitive environment

EXTERNAL THREATS

TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION

• Hackers

• Faster networks

• Organised crime

• More storage in smaller devices

• Changes in regulatory framework

• Technological convergence
• Increasingly mobile workforce

3.2 Focus Areas of Defence in Depth Strategy
An important principle of the Defence in Depth strategy is that achieving
Information Assurance requires a balanced focus on four primary elements,
namely People, Technology and Processes (or Operations) and Governance.
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INFORMATION ASSURANCE
GOVERNANCE

PEOPLE

TECHNOLOGY

PROCESSES/
OPERATIONS

DEFENCE IN DEPTH STRATEGY

Figure 2: People, Processes, Technology and Governance
Figure 2 outlines the basic principles of a Defence in Depth strategy. The strategy
is based on the concepts of technology, people and processes (or Operations), and
governed in terms of a management framework.
Furthermore, it is of paramount importance to determine what the organisations’
system priorities are. In other words which systems are critical to business
operations and are needed to ensure operational effectiveness and a competitive
advantage?

3.2.1 Technology
Technology refers to solutions that organisations employ that enable them to
achieve and sustain their business objectives. Key focus areas for implementing a
Defence in Depth strategy in terms of technology would include the management
of network architecture, infrastructure management, application security and
communications management.
A wide range of products are available that provide for Information Assurance
services and detecting intrusions. It is, however, of paramount importance to
ensure that the organisation’s procurement policy is aligned to the overall
Defence in Depth strategy and that the right technology is procured in accordance
with the achievement of overall business objectives. An effective procurement
policy and process must have regard to the organisation’s security policy, what
level of security is needed for a particular application, if the particular product has
been validated by a reputable third party, a risk analysis pertaining to the
acquisition of the particular technology or product, issues of integration with
current systems and processes, etc.

60

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4)
3.2.2 People
Within the context of the Defence in Depth strategy People refers to the security
roles and responsibilities for internal and external persons. It is essential to
define, maintain and enforce security roles and responsibilities for employees
within the organisation, contractors or business partners that the organisation
deals with, service providers that are used where functions are outsourced and
service providers that supply products or services to the organisation.
Another key focus area would be user awareness and ensuring that all relevant
internal and external persons are fully aware of and conversant with their
particular role and responsibility and the procedural and governance framework,
as well as policies applicable to them.

3.2.3 Processes (or Operations)
Processes (or Operations) refer to the standardised actions which are used to
ensure the organisation’s position on security is sustained. What this means in
terms of the Defence in Depth strategy is that organisations must define, maintain
and enforce standardised actions/processes which are used to develop and sustain
its position on security on a daily basis.
Key focus areas for the implementation of the strategy would typically include
identity and user-access management, incident response management, disaster
recovery management and audit management.
The NSA provides the following examples of activities that are traditionally
categorised under this heading:


Maintaining a visible and up to date system security policy.



Certifying and accrediting changes to the Information Technology
baseline. These processes should provide the data to support risk
management-based decisions. It should also acknowledge that a “risk
accepted by one is a risk shared by many” in an interconnected
environment.



Managing the security posture of the Information Assurance
technology (e.g. installing security patches and virus updates and
maintaining access control lists).



Providing key management services and protecting the relevant
infrastructure.



Performing system security assessments, e.g. vulnerability scanners to
assess the continued “security readiness” of the organisation.



Monitoring and reacting to current threats.



Attack sensing, warning and response.
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Recovery and re-constitution.

3.2.4 Governance
Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy, governance refers to the
oversight and coordination of technology, people and processes that is provided in
terms of a management framework. Key focus areas for the implementation of
the Defence in Depth strategy would include risk management, information
security and policy and compliance management. Achieving Information
Assurance through a Defence in Depth strategy would traditionally begin with
commitment from a senior management level (such as from the Chief Information
Officer), based on a clear understanding of exactly what the threats are that the
organisation is facing. This is then followed up by integrating and aligning the
understanding with the organisation’s overall strategy, aligning with and
incorporating it into with the business objectives and goals, drafting and
implementing appropriate policies and deriving suitable procedures from them.
3.3 Core Principles of Defence in Depth Strategy
The TISN (TISN, 2008) defines the core principles of a Defence in Depth strategy
as follows:


Implementing measures according to business risks.



Using a layered approach which would mean that if a single control
fails, it would not result in the whole system being compromised. The
concept of a layered approach or layered defence is discussed under
paragraph 3.5.



Implementing controls in such a way that they would increase the
effort needed to attack and breach the system.



Implementing personnel, procedural and technical controls.

In order to successfully implement a Defence in Depth strategy management must
include the core principles of this strategy in the organisation’s overall strategy, in
their annual planning, as well as within their organisational structure.
It is important that the Defence in Depth strategy should not only protect against
attacks, but also enable organisations to detect attacks and effectively respond to
it. It must also be borne in mind that attacks can take place from multiple
locations by people from both inside the organisation or by outsiders. It would
therefore be necessary to deploy controls at multiple locations to guard against all
classes of attacks.
A further important consideration is that, in case of an attack happening within an
organisation, the audit trail must be of such a nature that it would assist the
organisation in taking appropriate internal disciplinary steps or that they would be
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able to provide sound evidentiary material and assistance to law enforcement
agencies where criminal proceedings are to be instituted.

3.4 Implementing a Defence in Depth Strategy
Implementing a Defence in Depth strategy requires a shift in paradigm.
Organisations must move away from the notion that IT security and/or
Information Assurance are stand-alone issues, to where these concepts become an
integral part of business planning, overall strategy, governance and operations.
If one were to explain in practical terms what the importance of achieving
Information Assurance is, try to imagine any organisation functioning without IT
systems and support and even more pertinently, how any organisation can sustain
its proper functioning and competitive advantage without securing, preventing
unauthorised access to and insuring availability and functionality of its critical
information.
According to the 2009 IDG Research Services Survey some companies are so
enthusiastic about the potential of new web and mobile technologies that they
deploy them without adequately securing critical processes and data.
Implementing a Defence in Depth strategy requires co-ordinating and integrating
knowledge of the overall strategy and goals of the organisation or department, the
internal environment (including systems, personnel and information assets), and
the internal and external threat environment.
The TISN (TISN, 2008) have identified four reasons why it is necessary to
implement a Defence in Depth strategy:


Expanding organisational boundaries: Businesses today form close
alliances with their business partners, customers and suppliers. This
results in hard-to-define external boundaries, for example where
business partners form a consortium to deliver a product, it might be
that they rely on the same infrastructure, IT systems, personnel, etc. to
deliver the specific product. There is a need to determine where the
organisations’ boundaries lie and what it is that it aims to protect by
implementing a Defence in Depth strategy.



Mobile workforce: It has become increasingly important for
employees to be able to access their company networks from a remote
location. Employees need to access their emails from home or have
their mail delivered to a Blackberry device. The close
interconnectivity between controls and office networks enable viruses
and worms to spread more easily to control systems (Lüders, 2006).



Decentralisation of services: As the use of computers in the
workplace increases, so does the provision of services and systems via
the intra and extranets. Previously it was only necessary to grant
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access to a select few, but these services and systems now have to be
provided to a broader set of users.


Increasing value of information: As stated above, businesses have
realised what the value of information is to maintaining and sustaining
a competitive advantage. Due to the value of information, it has
become increasingly important to apply stringent security measures to
guard against the loss, destruction, tampering and theft of a
businesses’ information. It is also important to ensure that the right
person has the right access to the right information at the right time.

The steps to implementing a Defence in Depth Strategy can be summarised as
follows:


Analysis of internal and external environment: The first step
towards implementing a Defence in Depth strategy would be to
analyse the internal and external environment in which an
organisation operates: what its strengths and weaknesses are, the
threats the organisation faces, what systems, assets, technology and
processes are being used? It is also necessary to establish what the
organisations’ overall strategy is, to determine if the Defence in Depth
strategy is aligned to business objectives and goals and if there is a
clear understanding of what the Defence in Depth strategy means for
the organisation, as well as what it would entail to implement it.



Determining the risks: The second step is to determine what risks
the organisation faces (in terms of Information Assurance): based on
the weaknesses, threats and vulnerabilities that have been identified it
is necessary to firstly establish if the organisation is aware of the
identified risks and if they understand the implications of such risks.
The identification of risks and proposing of mitigating actions must
always be done in light of the particular organisations’ risk appetite.



Implementation of Defence in Depth strategy: Once all risk areas
have been identified and mitigation plans proposed, it is necessary to
implement the proposed controls in such a way that it ensures
optimum functionality of systems, the integration of controls across
the organisation, as well as compliance with the overall business
strategy and risk management process.



Maintenance, monitoring and review: Due to the fast changing
environment of IT, it is necessary to continuously monitor and review
the functioning of the strategy, to adapt it to any changes in threats the
organisation might face, changes to business goals or objectives or
changes to the regulatory environment.
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3.5 Layered Defence Approach as part of Defence in Depth Strategy
Modern trends place increasing demands on information security within an
organisation: users need remote access to the network, third parties have to
access the organisation’s network to perform certain functions or access specific
information and more users within the organisation now need access to resources
that were previously granted to a select group of users.
The most effective way to secure information within these parameters would be
through implementing different layers of control as part of the Defence in Depth
strategy (Murali et al., 2007). Tippett (2004) warned that “perfection in
information security is impossible” and that smart people should zero in on
identifying and building layered security controls around the network, because
layering meant that even if one control failed, another was almost certain to catch
the problem.
Webopedia defines a layered defence as multiple layers of protection. A layered
defence means having multiple barriers to prevent attack, infiltration or malware
infestation. These may include malware protection, possibly from multiple
vendors, running at web and email gateways as well as on the desktop, firewalls at
the network edge and on endpoints, intrusion detection, system intrusion detection
systems and behavioural monitors, data leak prevention systems and a wealth of
other possible defences, all operating in harmony to provide best-possible
protection.
Controls will generally include both technical and process control mechanisms.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the layers of control implemented
around a business process or key piece of business information (TISN, 2008):
Physical Security

User Security

OS Security

INFORMATION

Application Security

Network Security

Database Security

Figure 3: Layered Controls
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Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy a layered defence would mean
that an organisation deploys multiple defence mechanisms between the attacker
and the target. Each of the mechanisms must present its own unique obstacle to
the attacker and must also include both protection and detection measures.
In practical terms it must increase the difficulty of successfully penetrating the
network and thereby reducing risk, but also at the same time increase the chances
of detecting the intruder:


It must identify users of a system by means of passwords, user names,
etc.



It must also be able to provide for mechanisms to effectively and
efficiently recover from damage caused by an attack.



It must also be possible to correlate the results of information from
various departments within a business and information from different
controls, in an effort to increase business intelligence that can be used
to identify and prevent future attacks and that can be shared within the
market or with law enforcement agencies.

Within a broader context the concept of layered defence can also refer to the
combined efforts of the public and private sector to combat cyber crime. The
most powerful weapon available to fight cyber criminals is the very same asset
they seek: information. Cyber criminals often rely on businesses, government
and law enforcement not sharing any information or connecting random attacks to
establish a modus operandi. They are often able to strike at different businesses
within a same industry within a relative short period of time, because businesses
are reluctant to share information about attacks with their counterparts. Although
this is understandable seen in light of the fact that businesses might loose
competitive advantage or market share, it is only the criminals that benefit from
not sharing information about attacks.
However, the more developed the methods of information sharing between
industry members, and between business and law enforcement agencies are, the
less the need for a situation where full public disclosure will be called for.
3.6 Maintaining a Defence in Depth Strategy
Maintaining a Defence in Depth strategy includes continuous monitoring and
evaluation of the effectiveness of the implemented program. This would include
evaluation the strategy to determine alignment where there are changes to the
organisations’ business objectives or the overall enterprise strategy, where there
are changes in the security profile or specific breaches in security occur, where
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there is an increase in particular security breach phenomena such as an increase in
key loggers that are being detected throughout the industry, as well as when
weaknesses or gaps that are identified within the current strategy.
The TISN (TISN, 2008) also recommends the model outline in Figure 4 to
analyse the combined effectiveness of individual protection layers – whether
currently in place or proposed for implementation. The effectiveness of these
individual protection layers must then be considered within the context of the
identified threat environment.

Information
Assets

Control & Monitoring
• Basic admin
systems
• Monitoring systems
(e.g. IDS)
• Logging and
physical protection

Prevention
• IPS
• Anti-malware
• Staff vigilance

Mitigation
• Policies and
procedures
• Staff
awareness
training
• Access
controls and
strict
configurations

Response
• Incident response
planning
• Business
continuity/
disaster recovery
planning
• Third party
coordination
processes

Figure 4: Layers of control protecting an information asset (TISN, 2008)
Practical guidelines for maintaining the strategy and improving on it where
applicable can include the following:


Know and understand your organisation: This includes an
understanding of the external environment and the threats facing the
organisation. It also refers to a thorough understanding of the internal
environment and the way the organisation operates – its employees,
levels of staff morale, business partners of the organisation, service
providers, etc.



Define security roles and responsibilities: Although security should
be everyone within an organisation’s concern, ownership of
information security should be assigned to specific individuals,
coupled with the necessary levels of authority and accountability. To

67

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4)
assist with the process it is recommended that security roles and
responsibilities be incorporated into job description and that
performance in terms of these areas be measured accordingly.


Adopt appropriate policies and procedures: Once the Defence in
Depth strategy has been drafted, the necessary policies and procedures
should be put in place to govern the proper use of IT within the
organisation, thereby ensuring optimal security. This would include
updating policies and procedures as the need arises and to incorporate
necessary changes in regulations, technology or operational
requirements, as well as training and the creation of awareness with
internal and external users. It is also critical to develop and define an
appropriate incident response procedure and that this procedure is
communicated to all users.



Continuous auditing and assessment of process: It is recommended
that a process of continuous auditing be implemented to ensure that
the strategy remains aligned to business objectives, adapts to changes
in technology or identified threats, and to allow for the analysis of
information that is gathered from the different implemented controls.



Stay up to date: Maintain awareness of new developments in both
technology and services. Use a risk-based approach to determine
when it would be necessary to upgrade or adapt current systems and
processes to accommodate new developments.



Effective public private partnerships: The effective control of cyber
crime requires more than just cooperation between public and private
security agencies. The role of the communications and IT industries
in designing products that are resistant to crime and that facilitate
detection and investigation is also of critical importance. To
effectively address cyber crime also calls for a less re-active and more
pro-active approach to the prevention, detection, investigation and
prosecution of these crimes. Whilst it might be that only law
enforcement can arrest criminals, service providers and private sector
organisations can do much to investigate and prevent cyber crime
(Forman, 2009). Within the context of a Defence in Depth strategy,
such partnerships can deliver valuable business intelligence to prevent
further attacks or to be able to detect them within an information
system. Criminal intelligence analysis needs to be integrated fully into
business intelligence, risk assessment needs to incorporate criminal
threats, and cyber security needs to be conceptualised as part of a
broader security problem that cannot be understood or dealt with in
strictly technical terms (Williams, 2009).
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4. CONCLUSION
In today’s world information is fast becoming the most valuable asset an
organisation has. Information underpins every strategy, system and business
objective within an organisation and without ready and reliable access thereto,
organisations cannot function on an optimal level.
It is however, critical to preserve the integrity of information, to ensure that it is
stored, transmitted and accessed securely and that any system designed to manage
and secure information is reliable, aligned to business objectives and in
accordance with the risk management approach of the organisation.
Achieving Information Assurance in an organisation through the implementation
of a Defence in Depth strategy poses significant benefits. It also ensures that
South African organisations are aligned to the regulatory provisions contained in
the ECT Act.
The shift in paradigm from a re-active to a pro-active approach and focusing on
prevention rather than the prosecution of criminals that attack your system, poses
benefits in terms of cost, time, resources and organisational reputation. The shift
in paradigm required also includes to the need for sharing business (and criminal)
intelligence and forming effective public private partnerships, reporting on threats
and attacks and balancing what is best for the organisation with what is best for
the community as a whole.
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